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A B S T R A C T
This paper reviews historical and existing drought and water policy in Australia in order to gain a sense of
the strengths and weaknesses in enabling effective adaptation to climate change. In particular, (a) the
social, economic, and environmental costs and beneﬁts of water trading and (b) the limitations of using
‘market-based’ instruments (MBIs), like water trading, for adapting to drought and water security
related climate change impacts are investigated. It was found that water trading has potential as a
climate change adaptation strategy with many beneﬁts experienced in previous and current versions of
water trading. However, there are also limitations and those negatively impacted by water trading are
hit hard. These social impacts of water trading have not been thoroughly investigated and are not well
understood. Signiﬁcant uncertainty also exists around the impacts of water trading on the environment
(e.g. changed hydrological regimes, underestimation of sustainable environmental ﬂows etc.). Proper
quantiﬁcation of these impacts is needed, however, it is a complex task given Australia’s large
hydroclimatic variability and the current lack of understanding as to how to optimise water needs of the
environment, humans, agriculture and other industries. It appears that ‘cap and trade’ quantity-based
MBIs such as water trading will eventually do what they are designed to do (i.e. reallocate a resource to
‘high value’ users). However, given that the ‘low value’ users in this case are agriculture and town/urban
water supply (not including drinking water) and the ‘high value’ users are mining, manufacturing, and
electricity production (i.e. high greenhouse gas emissions), do we really want the water trading MBI to
achieve its objective? And, what would the social and environmental ramiﬁcations of such a shift in
water use within Australia be? These questions, along with the limitations and potential implications of
using water trading (and MBIs in general) as a climate change adaptation tool, must be carefully
considered if past Australian drought and water policy failures are not to be repeated.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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Whilst the magnitude and impacts of anthropogenic climate
change remain uncertain (e.g. Blo¨schl and Montanari, 2010;
Montanari et al., 2010; Verdon-Kidd and Kiem, 2010; Kiem and
Verdon-Kidd, 2011; IPCC, 2012), the need to address climate
related risk and vulnerability continues to be both necessary and
urgent, particularly in relation to drought and water security
across much of urban and rural Australia (e.g. Nelson et al., 2008;* Tel.: +61 2 4921 8656.
E-mail address: Anthony.Kiem@newcastle.edu.au
0959-3780  2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.09.006
Open access under CC BY-NC-NFragar et al., 2010; Rickards, 2012; Kiem and Austin, 2013a).
Unfortunately, there is widespread acknowledgement that past
policy responses to drought and water resources management
have not worked effectively and are unlikely to do so in the future
(e.g. Edwards et al., 2009; Productivity Commission, 2009). As
such, there has recently been a shift in the scale, priorities and
strategies of traditional drought and water policy in Australia, best
illustrated by the multiple revisions and major debate associated
with the Murray–Darling Basin (MDB) Plan (www.mdba.gov.au/
basin-plan). The MDB Plan proposes to change the way water is
allocated between social, economic and environmental stake-
holders within the Murray–Darling Basin, an area that is home to
more than two million people and produces more than a third of
Australia’s food. Part of this involves the use of water trading as a
market-based instrument (MBI) for climate change adaptation (i.e.
to ensure water allocations set by the Murray–Darling BasinD license.
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Grafton, 2011; Wei et al., 2011; Kiem and Austin, 2013a, 2013b,
2013c) has found (and debate surrounding earlier versions of the
MDB Plan also illustrated) that there is confusion and uncertainty
associated with existing and proposed water and drought policy,
especially water trading – both with respect to what it means for
stakeholders and whether it will actually be successful in reducing
vulnerability to climate variability and change.
This paper ﬁrst presents an overview of historical and existing
drought and water policy in Australia in order to gain a sense of the
strengths and weaknesses in enabling effective adaptation to
climate change. Investigation is also conducted into the social,
economic, and environmental costs and beneﬁts of water trading
with insights gained into the implications of using MBIs for climate
change adaptation. Other limits and barriers to climate change
adaptation uncovered while conducting this research are also
discussed.
2. Drought and water policy in Australia: an historical overview
Management of Australian water resources has elicited an
extensive and long-running response from successive govern-
ments. Drought policy existed in various guises throughout the
1900s, largely as a focus of broader agricultural policy frameworks
(see James, 1973). Until the late-1980s, drought was thought to be
a climatic abnormality and as such was treated with disaster relief
policies and Exceptional Circumstances (EC) payments in a similar
way to ﬂoods, earthquakes and cyclones (Botterill and Wilhite,
2005). During the late-1980s, however, the view of drought as a
one-off, unpredictable and unmanageable natural disaster began
to be questioned in scientiﬁc and policy circles. Drought was
subsequently removed from national disaster relief arrangements,
and a task force was initiated to shape the most appropriate
response to drought.
Subsequently, the National Drought Policy (NDP) was estab-
lished in 1992 through collaboration between State and Common-
wealth Governments. The NDP was based on principles of self-
reliance, risk management and an understanding that drought is an
inherent feature of the Australian environment (Nelson et al.,
2010). Despite a focus on the agricultural sector assuming greater
responsibility for climate risks, provisions were included for EC
whereby applications for assistance could be made in times of
severe drought. The primary avenue for government assistance
was the Rural Adjustment Scheme (RAS, previously termed the
Farmers’ Debt Adjustment scheme and also the Rural Reconstruc-
tion schemes) and the Farm Household Support Scheme (FHSS).
The RAS adopted structural adjustment initiatives to improve farm
productivity, proﬁtability and sustainability. These initiatives
included interest rate subsidies, commercial borrowings, and
small grants, all of which were subject to substantial increases
under a provision of EC. The FHSS, however, was aimed at
encouraging unviable farmers to exit the industry (Botterill and
Wilhite, 2005). Together, the policy framework was viewed as a
holistic response to recurrent drought events.
However, during the 1990s, drought policy faced challenges
and debates resulting both from the accumulated effects of
decades of inadequate drought response and from the most recent
concerted attempts to address policy shortcomings and establish
farming self-management and sustainability. Along with consid-
erable political pressures from welfare, academic and inﬂuential
industry groups, the challenges facing governments included:
 prolonged, expanding and worsening drought conditions across
signiﬁcant agricultural producing regions (e.g. Verdon-Kidd and
Kiem, 2009); widespread inconsistency, abuse and normalisation of EC
declarations;
 increasing focus on government intervention rather than self-
management and sustainability;
 the situation where EC payments artiﬁcially kept unviable and/or
poorly managed farm businesses aﬂoat – this view of EC
payments as ‘‘money wasted on people that shouldn’t be farming
anyway’’ emerged frequently throughout the Kiem and Austin
(2013a, 2013b, 2013c) interviews, surveys and workshops and is
consistent with Burke (2010);
 evidence of widespread welfare gaps in the farmer support
system (Botterill and Wilhite, 2005).
Successive reviews and amendments of the NDP and RAS
occurred throughout the late-1990s and 2000s. Changes included:
further clariﬁcation and separation of EC declarations and
processes; adjustments to interest rate subsidies; Exit Grants (a
one-off payment of up to $150,000 for farmers who sold their farm
enterprise); income support; and increasing access to social and
economic support services. However, despite these changes, many
of the issues surrounding drought and water management policy
in the 1990s have continued into the 21st century (for further
details refer to recent reviews of Australian water and drought
policy by Henderson (2012), Botterill (2013) and Botterill and
Cockﬁeld (2013)).
Drought and water policy makers in Australia are now faced
with a number of recommendations which, in line with a
strengthening focus on climate change adaptation, recognise more
than previous efforts the critical importance of moving beyond
crisis management towards supporting long-term, sustainable and
coordinated drought policies. Importantly, there is now a
recognised need to rethink the NDP and particularly the EC
provisions, which are ineffective and inequitable, perversely
encourage poor management practices, create unnecessary stress
for families, and provoke resentment between farmers and farming
regions based on inclusion criteria in the scheme (Drought Policy
Review Expert Social Panel, 2008 (also known as the Kenny
Report); Productivity Commission, 2009; Kiem and Austin, 2013a,
2013c). The reviews also emphasise the need to help farmers
improve their self-reliance, preparedness and drought manage-
ment and/or adaptation practices.
In addition, the three reviews suggest that the government
programmes used to support an adaptive response need to afﬁrm
that prolonged periods of drought are natural and routine, as
opposed to an unexpected event. It is also necessary to ensure that
decision-making on drought response is undertaken independent-
ly of extreme drought events when public emotions and political
effects are heightened. Similarly drought adaptation strategies
should not be shelved during periods of above average rain.
Drought and ﬂood adaptation strategies need to co-exist – one
should not replace the other as the climate oscillates between its
wet and dry phases. This coexistence of strategies is especially
important given the anthropogenic climate change projections for
Australia which suggest that increases in the frequency and
duration of droughts could be associated with increases in the
frequency of short-lived but intense rainfall events (e.g. IPCC, 2007,
2012).
The reviews advised government to produce coordinated
programmes of support that move beyond overlapping and
short-term initiatives towards long-term, sustainable, proactive
and ﬂexible approaches to drought and equitable distributions of
drought support services across regions. For example, the
Productivity Commission Review (Productivity Commission,
2009) suggests the replacement of the NDP with an extended
version of Australia’s Farming Future – which focuses on
adaptation, research and building the skills of farmers. As another
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Australian Government, in partnership with the Western Austra-
lian Government, is conducting a pilot of drought reform measures
in part of Western Australia that tests a package of new measures
developed in response to the recent reviews of drought policy
(www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/drought-pilot). The measures
are designed to move from a crisis management approach towards
pro-active and strategic risk management. The aim is to better
support farmers, their families and rural communities in preparing
for future challenges, rather than waiting until they are in crisis to
offer assistance. The drought reform measures considered are
summarised in Fig. 1.
In addition, social dimensions of climate change adaptation and
resilience will also need to be escalated as part of revised drought
policy. Examples such as the Drought Mental Health Assistance
Program in NSW represent attempts to support communities in
responding collectively to their social and emotional needs with
respect to the recent (mid-1990s to 2010) Big Dry or Millennium
drought (e.g. Verdon-Kidd and Kiem, 2009), and also to plan ahead
for the next one (Hart et al., 2011). This programme is consistent
with the growing emphasis on the social and emotional dimen-
sions of climate change adaptation which recognises that better
understanding of social impacts, and outcomes will mutually
support improved economic and environmental outcomes (e.g.
Drought Policy Review Expert Social Panel, 2008).
Policy is one key mechanism for driving mitigation and
adaptation to climatic change and extreme climatic events such
as drought. Yet for policy to be effective, it needs to be ﬂexible
enough to persist through the various scales and sites of
government, non-government businesses, and as part of diverse
local contexts within which policy aims may become confused and
conﬂict with existing practice. Research on various forms of
environmental management and adaptation consistently point to
the signiﬁcance of local governments and communities in
achieving policy aims and effectively shaping policy to local
contexts (O’Toole, 2001; Brunckhorst and Reeve, 2006; Urwin and
Jordan, 2008). It is imperative that drought policies, such as those
emerging from the above mentioned reviews, set the tone for
adaptation yet provide the ﬂexibility and openness to local
contexts that will provide the foundations for robust and effective
drought adaptation strategies and support programmes.Fig. 1. The seven drought reform measures being considered in the Western 3. Current water policy in Australia: preparing to exist with less
As mentioned above, existing Commonwealth, State and Local
government water policies and adaptation strategies have
recently been revised, with a view towards preparing for a future
with less water (e.g. Nelson et al., 2008; Connell and Grafton,
2011; Wei et al., 2011; and the MDB Plan (www.mdba.gov.au/
basin-plan)). For example, an attempt was made to coordinate
innovative, national and holistic approaches to adapting to
climate change and variability through the establishment of the
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efﬁciency (DCCEE) in
2007 – in March 2013, the DCCEE was abolished with climate
change functions transferred to the new Department of Industry,
Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary
Education. DCCEE’s 2009–2010 Corporate Plan outlined
the delivery of the Australian Government’s climate change
framework, based on the three principles of: reducing Australia’s
greenhouse gas emissions; adapting to impacts of climate change
that cannot be avoided and; contributing towards a global
solution to climate change. More speciﬁcally, DCCEE’s actions
in relation to adaptation included:
 the coordination of a national climate adaptation policy;
 the development and coordination of a National Climate Change
Research Strategy for Primary Industries (CCRSPI);
 establishing a Commonwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research
Organisation (CSIRO) Climate Adaptation Flagship;
 the establishment of the National Climate Change Adaptation
Research Facility (NCCARF) – managed by Grifﬁth University and
designed to improve understanding of the impacts of climate
change in Australia and to develop appropriate adaptation
responses.
This section further outlines the main policy frameworks and
programmes governing water security and use across the three
levels of Australian government, with northwest Victoria focussed
on as an example at the State and Local government level and to
coincide with the case studies previously investigated in Kiem et al.
(2011) from which the personal experiences discussed in Section 4
were obtained.Australian pilot study (www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/drought-pilot).
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The Australian Government’s national framework, Water for the
Future, comprises The Water Act 2007 (DEWHA, 2010a) and
advances the previous implementation of the National Water
Initiative (NWI) by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).
The framework recognises the four key priorities of: (i) taking
action on climate change; (ii) using water wisely; (iii) securing
water supplies and; (iv) supporting healthy rivers. These priorities
will be delivered through a $12.9 billion investment over a ten year
(2010–2020) period of strategic programmes, improved water
management arrangements, and a renewed commitment to
deliver a range of water policy reforms in rural and urban areas.
Several policies and programmes within this national framework
(DEWHA, 2010b) affect the MDB, which is signiﬁcant given that the
MDB contains 65% of Australia’s irrigated land area, 40% of Australia’s
farms and is the most agriculturally productive area in Australia ($15
billion worth or 39% of Australia’s total agricultural production
annually). This is also relevant to the water trading case study
presented Section 5.2. Recent policies relating to the MDB include:
 the ‘Driving Reform in the Basin’ programme supports contribu-
tions from the Australian Government to the operation and water
reform functions of the Murray–Darling Basin Authority
(MDBA);
 $5.8 billion committed to the Sustainable Rural Water Use and
Infrastructure programme to assist irrigation communities to
upgrade irrigation systems, increase water use efﬁciency and
make early adjustments in anticipation of caps to water
extraction;
 ‘Restoring the Balance in the Basin’ has been allocated $3.1
billion to purchase water entitlements to return to the
environment to protect or restore environmental assets;
 Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) manages
water entitlements acquired by the Commonwealth to be used
for environmental watering;
 ‘Living Murray Initiative’, managed by the MDBA, focuses on six
icon sites of international signiﬁcance in the improvement of the
health of the Murray River;
 $200 million committed to the ‘Strengthening Basin Communi-
ties’ program to assist local governments in the MDB to conduct
community-wide planning for a future with less water and to
deliver water saving initiatives;
 ‘MDB Sustainable Yields’ project, conducted by the CSIRO,
provides estimates of current and future water availability in
the MDB;
 development and uptake of smart technologies and practices in
water use across Australia has been accelerated through ‘Water
Smart Australia’ projects, including the Wimmera Mallee
Pipeline project (completed April 2010);
 efﬁciency of water registers, transaction and market information
functions will be improved by the development of a National
Water Market System (NWMS) as part of the NWI;
 the MDB Plan (www.mdba.gov.au/basin-plan), and associated
sustainable diversion limits (SDLs), appears likely to result in a
signiﬁcant shift of water allocation towards the environment at
the expense of irrigation. This has potentially profound effects on
the viability of irrigation enterprises and other industries and
communities that rely on water from the Murray–Darling system
(e.g. Connell and Grafton, 2011; Wei et al., 2011; Kiem and
Austin, 2013a, 2013c). The draft MDB Plan (November 2011) was
widely criticised and major revisions were undertaken resulting
in what was referred to as the ‘Proposed Basin Plan–a revised
draft’ released in May 2012 which was again revised and adopted
in November 2012 as the MDB Plan (see www.mdba.gov.au/
basin-plan for further details).3.2. State government water policy: Victorian context
Enacted by the Victorian Government in 2004, Our Water Our
Future is a long-term plan detailing 110 actions for sustainable
water management over the next ﬁfty years (http://www.water.-
vic.gov.au/initiatives). The regional Sustainable Water Strategies
(SWS, www.ourwater.vic.gov.au/programs/sws) are run by the
State government, but with considerable regional stakeholder
engagement. In 2007, the Our Water Our Future plan provided for a
new desalination plant in Melbourne, modernisation of the
irrigation system in the ‘food bowl’ (i.e. the Northern Region of
Victoria), expansion of Victoria’s water grid, increased recycling
and conservation of water and also developed the regional
Sustainable Water Strategies (SWS, http://www.water.vic.go-
v.au/initiatives/sws). The SWS were developed via partnerships
between the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environ-
ment (DSE), water corporations, Catchment Management Authori-
ties (CMAs), key regional stakeholders and community and interest
groups. The SWS outline the enhancement of policies and the
delivery of programmes as mechanisms for more efﬁciently
managing the available water supply whilst protecting and
reducing risks to agriculture, the environment and communities
in preparation for a future with less water.
3.3. Regional government water policy: Northern and Western
Regions of Victoria
Given the signiﬁcance of their contribution to national
agricultural production, several strategies have been developed
to address water supply security in the Northern and Western
Regions of Victoria, including:
 Sustainable Water Strategies (SWS, http://www.water.vic.gov.
au/initiatives/sws): as discussed these are State lead strategies
but with signiﬁcant regional/local stakeholder engagement.
 Loddon Mallee Regional Strategic Plan (RMCG, 2009a, 2009b): As
part of the Loddon Mallee Regional Strategic Planning project
(www.gannawarra.vic.gov.au/council/policy-and-strategy-
documents/loddon-mallee-strategic-regional-plans/), chal-
lenges faced are deﬁned as a result of the reliance on industries
dependent on rainfall and/or water allocations (RMCG, 2009a).
At the time of writing the Loddon Mallee Regional Strategic Plan
the Big Dry drought was identiﬁed as the major driver of change
in the Northern Loddon Mallee region. Farmers faced increasing
ﬁnancial, physical and mental pressures as a result of lower
rainfall and decreasing water allocations (e.g. Rickards, 2012;
Kiem and Austin, 2013a, 2013c). However, the MDB Plan has the
potential to be as (or more) inﬂuential as the drying climate,
especially for areas such as Mildura that are heavily reliant on
irrigation. In order to face these challenges the Loddon Mallee
Regional Strategic Plan determined that the region must develop
a more diverse economic base to reduce the reliance on
agricultural and horticultural sectors. The following four
priorities were identiﬁed: (i) establish a social contract (i.e.
transitioning away from funding models) with inland rural
communities to increase access to services and social opportu-
nities; (ii) develop a robust and diverse economic base so as to
reduce the reliance on rainfall and water allocations; (iii) connect
people and services through improvements to transport and
telecommunications; (iv) support diversity through coordina-
tion and the sharing of experiences.
 Wimmera Southern Mallee Drought Report (RMCG, 2007): In
response to the Big Dry the Wimmera Development Association
(WDA), on behalf of several local municipalities, commissioned a
report (RMCG, 2007) to assess impacts associated with the Big
Dry and to make recommendations for the future of the region.
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diate response to drought, medium to long term response to
drought and overall regional growth. Several of the objectives set
by the steering committee mirror the key insights from Kiem
et al. (2011) and Rickards (2012), resulting in common themes,
focuses and recommendations.
 Regional Catchment Strategies developed by the State’s
ten statutory CMAs as ‘regional sustainability blueprints’ are
also emerging. This network governance approach has
transformative potential but there are signiﬁcant challenges
ahead: the complex task of aligning of national, state,
catchment and local government strategies; the scarcity of
mechanisms and tools to assist in translation of strategies into
integrated investment priorities; gaps in knowledge and
understanding of natural resource management problems;
limitations in the capacity of regional and local bodies; and
getting the policy tools right within the framework (Whittaker
et al., 2004).
4. Drought and water policy at the front line: Personal
experiences from rural Australia
To put the above policy overview into context, personal
experiences of the stresses associated with drought and water
security were obtained via interviews and workshops conducted in
the Kiem et al. (2011) regional Victoria case studies. The
agriculture industry is confronting a series of fundamental changes
including the expansion of farms and farm trade, declines in farm
succession, and increasing uncertainty around crop selection and
investment. Some of these issues are a direct result of drought and
a drying environment, however, others are related to policy
decisions, trade and agricultural markets well beyond the scale of
the affected rural communities. Water reforms have continued the
process of unbundling of water from the land, to create a water
market of tradeable and saleable water. The reforms were based on
‘faith in markets’ that would lead to water being allocated ‘‘to its
most valuable use, thereby ensuring a range of socially optimal
outcomes’’ (Quiggin, 2007). The responses to this marketisation
process, however, have been varied and range from confusion and
resentment through to experimentation and learning to manipu-
late the water market. Most often, people identiﬁed the rapidity
and volatile nature of water deregulation as major challenges but
producers are progressively learning how to best engage with the
water market, without the signiﬁcant losses of income that
occurred through the early stages of unbundling. The following
statements (obtained during the Kiem et al. (2011) study) capture
some of these experiences:
‘‘There wasn’t the understanding of how you manage water
security being threatened. We might be able to manage drought but
it’s been the policy issues and intervention in the [water] market
which causes a whole range of other issues.’’
(CEO – Mildura Development Corporation (MDC))
‘‘It’s another set of rules and it’s getting quite complex and
sophisticated. Some operators can really ﬁne-tune their businessTable 1
Water allocation (%) from Mildura Region River Systems (RMCG, 2009a, 2009b).
River System Water allocations at end of season
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Murray 129% 100% 100% 
Goulburn 57% 100% 100% 
Campaspe 100% 100% 39% 
Loddon 57% 67% 100% risk. Others get very confused and caught out by the rules, which is
understandable as it’s a rapidly changing ﬁeld.’’
(Consultant – RM Consulting Group (RMCG))
‘‘Farmers that have lost their water would be critical of the
unbundling of water. But some are more progressive and see an
opportunity to use every asset that they’ve got, to trade off excess
water or buy in cheap water at appropriate times.’’
(Coordinator – Rural Financial Counselling Service (RFCS))
Engaging with this newly forming water market can be ‘‘tricky’’
(CEO – MDC) and a ‘‘nightmare’’ (Farmer – Mildura Region) for
farmers but it is the rapidity of the reforms, and their coincidence
with a range of other water supply and agricultural changes, which
have presented the most signiﬁcant problems for farmers. In the
early stages of reform there were a number of producers who lost
signiﬁcant amounts of money in the trade of water (e.g. those who
sold off water prior to unexpected and severe reductions in water
allocations, only to have to buy water back at inﬂated prices; those
producers who bought water to top-up predicted water alloca-
tions, only for allocations to increase late in the season, thus
leaving them with more than they needed). Since then, changes
have been made to ensure that excess water purchased can be
carried over to the following year. Indeed, governments, across
State and Commonwealth levels, have been slowly developing
‘‘more clarity and transparency in terms of the water allocation and
trading rules’’ (Consultant – RMCG), a process which will need to be
ongoing. Despite these revisions, many producers suffered
considerable losses and stresses in learning how to navigate an
evolving and shifting water market, and have had to rapidly adjust
their agricultural planning and mindset to weigh up potential
water losses, the cost of water versus the value of crops, and the
declining value of land unaccompanied by water – a change which
has seen many farmers exit the industry entirely. To some degree
this could be seen as a risk of business (i.e. nobody is forced people
to sell or buy water), however, it highlights another challenge for
rural communities (i.e. water trading) that did not exist in previous
droughts and will have to be considered in the future.
A key part of water security, alongside water trading, is
allocations. The signiﬁcant and unanticipated declines in water
allocations over recent years (see Table 1) have seriously impacted
on the viability of some farms in the region.
Moreover, these changes to water allocations are combined
with the Commonwealth government’s proposed water buy-back
scheme, to increase ﬂows in the Murray–Darling River system (the
ﬁnal outcome of which remains uncertain as the MDB plan has
only recently (November 2012) been adopted and is in the process
of being implemented). This combination of changes creates
uncertainty around water security and supply into the future:
‘‘We went from 100% water allocation to zero. So it guaranteed that
96 years out of 100 they would have 100% water allocation, with a
worst case scenario of 60%. . .and then suddenly, we went to zero
which was huge in terms of how irrigators formulated their
business.’’
(Senior Planner – Victorian Department of Planning and
Community Development (DPCD))2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
141% 95% 43% 35%
100% 29% 57% 33%
31% 0% 18% 0%
100% 0% 5% 0%
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the start of the season, which is important for permanent plantings.
So at the start of the season we were looking at a grim forecast of
23–26% per cent maximum, so a lot of people bought water, and
now we are sitting at 77%. So a lot of people bought water they
didn’t end up needing.’’
(Project Ofﬁcer – Victorian Department of Primary Industries
(DPI))
‘‘Adding to the uncertainty of being able to plan is the pending
release of the Murray–Darling Basin Plan which will determine
how much water is available for consumptive use. . .indications are
that it will be a reduction in water availability.’’
(Consultant – RMCG)
Water security is essential for producers to be able to plan,
invest in, and irrigates their crops or water stock. Currently, there is
a range of issues creating uncertainty and confusion in the minds
and practices of irrigators. People expressed frustration at the
variability and ad hoc nature of allocations (e.g. between states,
from season to season, from forecasts to actual allocations) and at
the uncertainty surrounding future water allocations. Many
farmers have invested considerable sums of money in new
irrigation systems and on-farm technologies to cope with changes
to the farming industry, yet are struggling to negotiate the
uncertainties of water supply. Common across government,
agency and farming representatives was the need for a stable
and secure water allocation and buy-back system which can be
more readily and effectively negotiated, planned for, and managed
by farmers. The MDB Plan attempts to address this issue but proper
understanding of what is sustainable and what is not and how to
best balance and optimise the water needs of the environment,
agriculture, other non-agricultural industry, and human settle-
ments is proving to be complex.
5. Limits and barriers to incorporating climate change
adaptation into drought and water policy
The concepts of limits and barriers to adaptation are often used
together or interchangeably. However, Moser and Ekstrom (2010)
differentiate between the two with limits deﬁned as ‘‘obstacles that
tend to be absolute in a real sense: they constitute thresholds beyond
which existing activities, land uses, ecosystems, species, sustenance, or
system states cannot be maintained’’. Limits to adaptation are the
residual impacts remaining after successful adaptation strategies
have been implemented and can be either ecological limits,
economic limits, technological limits or social limits. Barriers, on
the other hand are ‘‘obstacles that can be overcome with concerted
effort’’ (Moser and Ekstrom, 2010).
Kiem and Austin (2013a, 2013b) identiﬁed that a major
constraint preventing incorporation of climate change adaptation
into water resource management and planning was not just access
to available and relevant climate change information, but also, a
lack of understanding of potential adaptive responses and their
effectiveness and also challenges associated with making decisions
under uncertainty. These barriers are exacerbated by minimal
specialist skills and a limited number of resources, supporting the
earlier ﬁndings of Whittaker et al. (2004). The agricultural,
economic and social impacts of the recent Big Dry drought appear
to have highlighted and accelerated changes in the agricultural
sector and demographic make-up of regional and agricultural
areas. This creates a complex environment and highlights the fact
that there are other factors besides climate variability and/or
change that make water resource management and drought
adaptation difﬁcult (e.g. Sherval and Askew, 2011; Rickards, 2012;Kiem and Austin, 2013a). These other factors include: uncertainty
around water trade, allocations and security; commodity prices;
and a changing farming sector. In this study we focus on water
trading and the fact that even though it is an attempt at a holistic
climate change adaptation and water management, the current
reality of water trading is that the commercial side of trading is
complex and it is difﬁcult for most farmers to manage (Wei et al.,
2011; Kiem and Austin, 2013a). This is largely because allocations
are made subject to the availability of water (i.e. reactive) and are
expressed as probabilities meaning that in some cases the
availability of water (in the minds of many involved in the water
markets) becomes even more uncertain than it was. The Big Dry
highlighted that in areas relying on irrigation, there is an
immediate need for a stable and secure water allocation and a
buy-back system which can be more effectively negotiated,
planned for, and managed by farmers. The MDB Plan may provide
stability, but the participants in the Kiem et al. (2011) regional
Victoria case studies, suspected, and it has subsequently been
conﬁrmed (Connell and Grafton, 2011; Wei et al., 2011), that there
will likely be stakeholders who are negatively affected by this
‘stability’.
As indicated above, developing robust drought and water policy
in Australia is already difﬁcult and incorporating successful
climate change adaptation strategies into such policy is associated
with further barriers and limitations. This is discussed below with
emphasis on water trading and the MDB Plan. Note that in this case
it is difﬁcult to distinguish between a limit and a barrier because
while many of the barriers ‘could’ be overcome there is no
indication that this will happen – hence the barrier remains a limit
until concrete actions are implemented to overcome the obstacle.
5.1. Limits and barriers to using market-based instruments (MBIs) for
climate change adaptation
One way to implement policy is via market-based instruments
(MBIs) that utilise a range of market-like approaches to inﬂuence
people’s behaviour (NMBIPP, 2004). MBIs achieve outcomes by:
altering market prices; setting a cap or altering quantities of a
particular good; improving the way a market works; or creating a
market where no market presently exists (Fig. 2). Water trading is
an example of a ‘cap and trade’ quantity-based MBI. Exceptional
Circumstances Exit Grants, Small Block Irrigators Exit Grant
(available only in the MDB), and deregulation of industry are all
examples of price-based MBIs (although the Exit Grants are also
related to Market Friction).
Numerous studies have been conducted into the use of MBIs
aimed at the mitigation of anthropogenic climate change (i.e.
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) (e.g. Garnaut, 2011).
However, research into the use of MBIs for adaptation to climate
change is in its infancy. To clarify, adaptation differs from
mitigation, as it focuses on coping with the impacts of climate
change rather than aiming to reduce the causes. The following
sections outline the strengths and weakness of MBIs for climate
change adaptation (MBIs for mitigation are not investigated here),
focusing on water trading as one type of MBI.
Whitten et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive overview of the
strengths and weakness of MBIs in the ecological or natural
resources sector and many of their conclusions are relevant here. In
particular: ‘‘MBI beneﬁts result from harnessing ‘gains from trade’.
Gains are derived from differences, or heterogeneities, between market
participants’ preferences, resources or production opportunities.
Future gains are captured by creating positive incentives to improve
management rather than to avoid regulation, and encourage
innovation. Where these gains cannot be harnessed an MBI will
perform no better, and may perform worse than other measures’’
(Whitten et al., 2007).
Fig. 2. Types of Market Based Instruments (NMBIPP, 2004).
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 ﬂexible adoption of targeted behavioural change. One of the
attractions of MBIs for governments is that change is driven by
people making choices in a context (created by governments)
rather than by public servants making direct decisions;
 contributing to long-term and self-sustaining solutions (e.g.
water trading increases capacity to react to changes in
circumstances and allows more ﬂexible risk management and
decision making (RIRDC, 2007));
 encouraging innovation to achieve MBI objectives, often
facilitating longer term change;
 addressing market failures (NMBIPP, 2004).
In general the weaknesses of MBIs include:
 the conundrum that while a strength of MBIs is that they can
facilitate ﬂexible adoption of targeted behavioural change this
can also be a weakness (i.e. there is the potential that MBIs could
lead to social, environmental and economic changes that are
unplanned or not in line with the intended strategic direction;
 those that can afford the burden of a market-based penalty will
continue to engage in activities at a higher cost and without the
behavioural change targeted by the MBI;
 those that are unable (or do not choose) to cover the penalty
price, will transfer the burden to consumers.
The two weaknesses of MBIs mentioned are particularly
relevant to drought adaptation and water resource management
as it highlights the fact that MBIs do not ensure behavioural
change, but instead have the potential to pass on extra costs to
members of society who are already vulnerable. This reﬂects the
opinion of many in the small inland communities where the costs
of staying on the farm are increasing but vulnerability to drought is
seen to be still much the same (or worse due to other factors such
as the ﬁnancial crisis, changing demographics, etc.) (e.g. Rickards,
2012; Kiem and Austin, 2013a, 2013c).
5.2. Case study on strengths and weaknesses of MBIs for climate
change adaptation: water trading in the Murray–Darling Basin
To assess and understand the strengths and weaknesses of
water trading as a MBI for climate change adaptation we use theMDB as a case study. The MDB (Fig. 3) covers 14% of mainland
Australia, 65% of Australia’s irrigated land area, 40% of Australia’s
farms and is the most agriculturally productive area in Australia
(the MDB generates $15 billion worth of agricultural produce
annually which is 39% of Australia’s total). The recent Big Dry had
devastating effects on the environmental, social and economic
systems in the MDB. These impacts highlight the need for
improved adaptation strategies, and as part of that a water trading
scheme is part of the MDB Plan.
The MDB Plan (adopted November 2012), and the associated
controversy and criticism, represents a salient case study into the
complexity and limitations associated with implementing water
trading in Australia. Three components are needed for a successful
‘cap and trade’ MBI such as water trading:
1. a monitorable and enforceable quantity cap that is placed on the
market that limits the amount of resource used in a deﬁned
area;
2. entitlements are deﬁned and distributed among the users;
3. a market is created to enable trading of entitlements.
The ﬁrst problem is the highly variable Australian climate
which means that for any given timeframe (e.g. season, year,
decade) it is highly uncertain as to how much rainfall and
streamﬂow will actually be received (e.g. Verdon-Kidd and
Kiem, 2009; Gallant et al., 2012). This then has implications
in deﬁning what is sustainable and what is not, what amounts
of water should be allocated for industry, environment, and
socio-economic purposes and what happens if people do not
receive their entitlements? Hence, at least the ﬁrst two
components needed for a successful ‘cap and trade’ MBI such
as water trading are extremely difﬁcult to meet due to the
variable nature of Australia’s climate, and the possibility that the
past may not be a good indicator of the future (e.g. due to
anthropogenic climate change, land-use changes, etc.). An added
complication in the case of the MDB is the cross-border
interactions and the need to involve multiple State and Territory
governments, each with different water policies, in the decision
making and policy development process (e.g. Connell and
Grafton, 2011).
Nevertheless, water trading is still seen as a viable climate
change adaptation option (e.g. Frederick et al., 1997; Luo et al.,
2003; RIRDC, 2007; NWC, 2010) and has existed in various forms
in the MDB since the late 1980s, with reforms necessary in the
Fig. 3. The regions of the MDB (www.mdba.gov.au/basin-plan).
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due to prolonged drought conditions (i.e. the Big Dry) that were
not anticipated when the original water trading rules were
developed (RIRDC, 2007; NWC, 2010). Refer to Table 1 in Wei et al.
(2011) for a comprehensive summary of the various initiatives onFig. 4. The economic value of water in Australia (based on data frowater resources management and policy in the MDB since the
1990s. The introduction and expansion of water markets was
based on the premise that ‘‘trading provides economic beneﬁts to
buyers and sellers, and to society as a whole, by reallocating scarce
water resources to higher valued uses’’ (NWC, 2010). RIRDC (2007)
explain that water trading was intended to facilitate the efﬁcient
use of water by moving the scarce resource to ‘‘more productive
uses’’. However, the issue highlighted by these statements is how
do you determine who is a ‘high value user’ or what is a ‘more
productive use’ and who makes that decision? Quantifying value
and productivity is relatively simple from an economic perspec-
tive (e.g. tonnes of wheat produced per litre of water) but the
social and environmental beneﬁts of water (or just as importantly
the negative social and environmental impacts of insufﬁcient
water) are much harder to assess. As such, there have always been,
and continue to be, concerns that water trading might have
adverse economic, social and/or environmental impacts if the
needs of all three are not properly understood, quantiﬁed and
addressed (RIRDC, 2007; NWC, 2010). Fig. 4 illustrates this
dilemma by clearly showing that agriculture uses a large
proportion of Australia’s water but, based on an economic
assessment, it is difﬁcult to conclude that agriculture is a ‘high
value user’ or one of the ‘more productive users’. Hence, unless
social and/or environmental value is also considered and
accounted for, an MBI such as water trading (as it currently
stands in Australia) will inevitably shift water away from sectors
like agriculture and town/urban water supply (not including
drinking water which is seen as a ‘critical human need’ by COAG
and hence given top priority) towards ‘high value’ users such as
mining and manufacturing. This highlights a fundamental
weakness of using MBIs as a climate change adaptation tool for
sectors with comparatively low economical value but critically
high value in terms of social and/or environmental sustainability.m the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), www.abs.gov.au).
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experience of water trading by quantifying the actual impacts of
water trading on individual water entitlement holders, industries
and communities. RIRDC (2007) concluded that permanent and
temporary trades must be considered together in order to
understand water trading. Both types of trade inﬂuence water
use in a region, and there is often an offsetting direction in
observed temporary and permanent trading. It was also evident
that water trading increases the capacity to react to changes in
circumstances and that water trading is a catalyst for change, thus
satisfying the objective of MBIs (Fig. 2). RIRDC (2007) also found
that it is difﬁcult to untangle effects of water trading from the
background of drought and that any approach implying that all
impacts associated with changes in water use are attributable to or
caused by water trading would be misleading and unhelpful for
policy development. This is consistent with the point raised above
relating to the highly variable nature of Australia’s climate and the
difﬁculties that poses in developing and assessing the performance
of any water trading scheme. There is an urgent need for more
research into this area in order to differentiate what part of the
changes in water use (or limitations or failure of water policy) are
due to inadequate water policy and which parts are due to variable
(or permanently changing) hydroclimatic conditions (Kiem and
Verdon-Kidd, 2011). The two are strongly related in that robust
water policy (including a robust water trading scheme) should
account for and be able to cope with changes in hydroclimatic
conditions but to date there has been minimal effort focussed on
assessing whether the existing and proposed water trading
schemes are sustainable under the range of historical and
projected Australian climate conditions or in fact whether such
a ‘climatically resilient’ water trading scheme is even possible.
RIRDC (2007) found that trade in permanent entitlements has
assisted existing industries and prompted development of new
horticultural ventures in Sunraysia (northwest Victoria and
southwest NSW) and that water trading allows more ﬂexible risk
management and farm decision making–including the decision to
leave agricultural production if that is the most appropriate (e.g.
Exit Grants). Water trading in an agricultural system that has both
annual and perennial crops gives farmers greater ﬂexibility in
making decisions about their priorities for water use, offers a
means of managing risk and cash ﬂow (particularly in dry times)
and facilitates business growth and development. However, water
trading also has negative social and economic effects for local
communities with strong fear in the community associated with
people selling their water entitlements and exiting the communi-
ty. Many people are opposed to water trading for this reason alone
(i.e. they fear it will exaggerate the already decreasing populations
of small rural communities and the reduction of services and sense
of community (Kiem and Austin, 2013a, 2013c)). The social
impacts in the regions studied by RIRDC (2007) are not merely a
temporary phenomenon associated with the introduction of water
trading. Rather, they are a permanent feature of regional
economies exposed to rapid shifts in investment between different
types (and locations) of irrigated agriculture that is facilitated by
water trading. Under existing and proposed water trading schemes
communities are either net exporters of water or net importers of
water. Communities exporting water experienced reduced popu-
lations and less local spending while communities importing water
experienced increased populations but may not necessarily have
the infrastructure and services to accommodate the new arrivals.
Either way, water trading ultimately means change and rural
communities can ﬁnd change and adjustment difﬁcult (e.g. RIRDC,
2007; Rickards, 2012; Kiem and Austin, 2013a, 2013c). Further
research is needed to properly understand the social implications
of water trading that have been touched on above (e.g. How will
water trading change the demographics of rural communities?What are the social impacts on people in rural communities that
reduce (or disappear) as a result of water trading? What are the
impacts on people and local governments in rural communities
that rapidly grow as a result of water trading?).
The NWC (2010) report paints a more positive picture of water
trading in the MDB, crediting the continued economic viability of
the region to the successes of the water market. The NWC (2010)
study covers the period 1998–1999 to 2008–2009, which
incorporates the Big Dry and demonstrates that water trading is
making a major contribution to the achievement of the NWI
objective of optimising the economic, social and environmental
value of water. NWC (2010) concludes that water trading has
signiﬁcantly beneﬁted individuals and communities across the
southern MDB with aggregate economic beneﬁts for the southern
MDB estimated to have increased Australia’s GDP by $220 million
in 2008–2009 through reallocations of water. In addition, despite
the length and severity of the recent Big Dry drought NWC (2010)
found only minimal reduction in economic output over that period.
However, this estimate was based on economic modelling which
includes a number of assumptions about water availability, market
conditions and individual behaviours and consultation with
irrigators suggests more mixed opinions, including:
 Conclusions from previous studies are correct when stating that
water trading has helped individual irrigators (buyers and
sellers) manage and respond to external drivers by allowing
more ﬂexible production decisions. This ﬂexibility improved
cash ﬂow, debt management and risk management;
 Restrictions on interregional water access entitlement trading
are limiting the beneﬁts of trading for individuals and creating
uncertainty for potential buyers and sellers;
 Improving trade transaction times could increase beneﬁts to
market participants;
 In most cases beneﬁts to individuals, including preventing the
loss of long-lived agricultural assets, translated to beneﬁts for
associated industries, regions and communities;
 Adverse economic and social impacts of water trading are usually
linked to cases where trade reduces local water use, irrigated
agricultural production and economic activity in associated
regions and industries;
 Water trading sometimes (e.g. southern MDB) allows high-value
industries to maintain production while other low-value
industries reduce production;
 There was sometimes no correlation between water trade
patterns and key socio-economic indicators (e.g. employment
in agriculture fell in all regions regardless of whether the region
was a net purchaser or seller of water) suggesting other factors
besides water or drought (e.g. commodity prices) had a greater
impact on inﬂuencing social and economic change (e.g. Sherval
and Askew, 2011; Rickards, 2012; Kiem and Austin, 2013a,
2013c).
Wei et al. (2011) also give a wide-ranging overview of irrigated
agriculture in the MDB and develop insights into the interactions
between water policy, agricultural policy, irrigation practices and
drought management in Australia since 1990. Fig. 5, extracted
from Wei et al. (2011) but based on work by Mallawaarachchi and
Foster (2009) which used farmer interviews and discussions with
water authorities to explore factors inﬂuencing water trading
behaviour, illustrates some further weaknesses of water trading as
a MBI for climate change adaptation. As outlined above (the third
component required for a successful ‘cap and trade’ quantity-based
MBI) water trading can only be successful if a market is created.
From Fig. 5 it is clear that a large percentage of irrigators/farmers
are not engaging in the water trading market for numerous reasons
that are not easily overcome – hence, this issue represents a
Fig. 5. Reasons irrigators/farmers do not sell (Fig. 8) or buy (Fig. 9) water in the MDB (from Wei et al., 2011).
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adaptation instrument.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
In assessing the limitations of water trading, and MBIs in
general, as a climate change adaptation tool, it is crucial although
challenging to differentiate between changes in water use due to
water policy and changes due to variable (or permanently
changed) hydroclimatic conditions. The two are strongly related
in that robust water policy (including a robust water trading
scheme) should account for and be able to cope with changes in
hydroclimatic conditions (e.g. Kiem and Verdon-Kidd, 2011).
However, to date there has been minimal effort focussed on
assessing whether the existing and proposed water trading
schemes are robust under the range of historical and projected
Australian climate conditions. In fact, it is unclear whether such a
‘climatically resilient’ water trading scheme is even possible. The
highly variable nature of Australia’s climate poses a signiﬁcant
barrier (potentially a limit) when developing and implementing
any water trading scheme.
Water trading has potential as a climate change adaptation
strategy with many beneﬁts experienced in previous and current
versions of water trading. However, there are also some signiﬁcant
limitations and the people and industries that are negatively
impacted by water trading are hit hard. Water trading can give
individual irrigators who understand the system and have the
ﬁnancial capacity to purchase water greater ﬂexibility in making
decisions about their priorities for water use and offer a means of
managing risk and cash ﬂow (particularly in dry times). However,
these beneﬁts are usually limited to the larger, well-informed
irrigators at the expense of the smaller ‘family-farm’ operations
which are crucial to many local communities. Hence, water trading
also has negative social and economic effects for rural communi-
ties with strong fear associated with people selling their water
entitlements and exiting the community. Water trading and the
associated redistribution of industry (and jobs and population)
have the potential to change rural communities permanently,
mostly via an acceleration of the changing demographics already
being experienced (e.g. ageing and declining population). There is
also concern about the social and economic impacts of water beingmoved away from agriculture through the purchase of water for
the environment. A counter argument is that most of this water
will be used in the same regions where it has been purchased and
will help preserve them as attractive places to live. In areas with
unsustainably high extractions, purchase of water for the
environment may actually prevent (or at least delay) environmen-
tal decline which inevitably leads to population decline, and
economic decline. Hence, this aspect of water trading (purchase of
water for the environment) is promising as the long-term social
and environmental beneﬁts may outweigh the economic return to
be gained from continuing with unsustainable agriculture. These
socio-economic impacts (both positive and negative) and limita-
tions of water trading are not well understood and further
investigation is required that involves ground truthing the realities
of water trading (historically, now and into the future).
However, as demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the
MDB Plan, signiﬁcant uncertainty also exists around the impacts of
water trading on the environment (e.g. changed hydrological
regimes, underestimation of sustainable environmental ﬂows etc.).
Proper quantiﬁcation of these impacts is needed, but can only be
achieved with a proper understanding of what is sustainable and
what is not and how to best balance and optimise the water needs
of the environment, agriculture, other non-agricultural industry,
and human settlements. It should also be noted that while water
trading is seen by many as a threat to the effort to preserve
environmental assets, the Australian Government’s Water for the
Future programme (www.environment.gov.au/water/australia/)
to buy entitlements for the environment through the water
market has proved reasonably effective. This is in contrast to
earlier NWI (http://nwc.gov.au/nwi) proposals, not supported by
State governments and strongly opposed by local communities, to
increase water for the environment by reducing entitlements
without compensation.
Finally, ‘cap and trade’ quantity-based MBIs such as water
trading will eventually do what they are designed to do (i.e.
reallocate a resource to ‘high value’ users). However, given that
Fig. 4 suggests that the ‘low value’ users appear to be agriculture
and town/urban water supply (not including drinking water which
is seen as a ‘critical human need’ by COAG and hence given top
priority) and the ‘high value’ users are mining, manufacturing, and
electricity production (i.e. industries with high greenhouse gas
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objective? And, what would the social and environmental
ramiﬁcations of such a shift in water use within Australia be?
These questions, along with the above-mentioned barriers,
limitations and potential implications of using water trading
(and MBIs in general) as a climate change adaptation tool, must be
carefully considered and rigorously investigated prior to imple-
mentation if past drought and water policy failures are not to be
repeated. Also important is that water trading as a mechanism to
manage climate change impacts is viewed as part of a package and
not assessed in isolation (e.g. used in conjunction with improved
climate forecasts and projections and also better communication
and education about uncertainty, risk, and decision making under
uncertainty).
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